

# How to Strengthen DES against Two Robust Attacks

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## Abstract

In this paper, we discuss unified conditions which enable DES being immunized against two known robust attacks, *i.e.*, differential and linear cryptanalysis and we also suggest a set of new 8 DES-like S-boxes generated by our new design conditions in order to replace with the current DES S-boxes. This leads us to conclude that DES can survive from two powerful attacks.

## 1 Introduction

Two cryptanalytic attacks have been widely published to imperil the security of DES (Data Encryption Standard) [1]. One is the DC (Differential Cryptanalysis) proposed by Biham and Shamir [2],[4] in 1990. The DC attack is a kind of chosen plaintext attack in a sense that an attacker has to choose huge  $2^{47}$  plaintexts and their corresponding ciphertexts, which is a very large number, to find an unknown 56-bit DES key. The other attack, known as LC (Linear Cryptanalysis), is more feasible than DC attack and was initiated by Matsui [6] in 1993. The overall complexity to break DES by LC attack has been reduced [14] to be  $2^{43}$  known plaintext and ciphertexts pairs comparing to the initial complexity of  $2^{47}$ . The common point of these two attacking methods is to use the cryptanalytic properties of DES S-boxes which is the only nonlinear function of DES.

Two researches in [3] and [5] have been reported to strengthen DES resistant against DC attack by only replacing the current DES S-boxes with new S-boxes based on the different design criteria rather than based on the well-known 6 design criteria of DES S-box. Two DES-like cryptosystems are named as  $s^2$ DES and  $s^3$ DES, respectively. By the efficient search techniques [11],[12] evaluating on the overall strength of DES against DC and LC attacks, the security of the full-round DES and  $s^i$ DES were found to be  $s^2$ DES  $<$  DES  $<$   $s^3$ DES against DC attack and  $s^3$ DES  $<$  DES  $<$   $s^2$ DES against LC attack.

In this paper, we focus ourselves on the design of DES-like S-boxes and discuss how to strengthen DES so as to be immunized against two robust attacks, and suggest a set of DES-like S-boxes to be replaced with the current DES S-boxes.

## 2 Design Criteria of DES S-boxes

The followings are the well-known 6 design criteria of DES S-boxes :

S-1 No S-box is a linear or affine function.

S-2 Changing one bit in the input of an S-box results in changing at least two output bits.

S-3 The S-boxes were chosen to minimize the difference between the number of 1's and 0's when any single bit is held constant.

S-4  $S(\mathbf{x})$  and  $S(\mathbf{x} \oplus (001100))$  differ at least two bits.

S-5  $S(\mathbf{x}) \neq S(\mathbf{x} \oplus (11ef00))$  for any e and f.

S-6  $S(\mathbf{x}) \neq S(\mathbf{x} \oplus (0abcd0))$  for any a, b, c, and d,  $abcd \neq 0000$ .

In addition to these criteria, Coppersmith [10] has recently published additional design criteria of DES S-boxes, such as

S-7 For a given nonzero input XOR and output XOR, no more than 8 of the outputs may exhibit the given output XOR among the 32 pairs of inputs exhibiting the given input XOR.

S-8 Similar to (S-7), but stronger restrictions in the case zero output XOR, for the case of 3 active S-boxes on round  $i$ .

S-9 Other criteria dealt with other issue, such as ease of implementation.

He has described that *most of the criteria are aimed at increasing the number of active S-boxes (against DC attack) involved over the 12 or 16 rounds of the "probable pattern", say this total number is  $k$ . Then (S-7), along with the simplifying assumption of independence, puts an upper bound of  $(1/4)^k$  on the overall probability of this "probable pattern".*

In other words, (S-7) means that the maximal entry in a XOR distribution table of any DES S-boxes is 16 and (S-8) means that nonzero input XOR with 3 active S-boxes resulting the same output always exists with some probability. From all criteria, we can conclude that the DES designers might initially put in mind the strength of DES against DC attack.

### 3 Resistance against DC attack

The important properties of DES-like S-boxes are derived through an analysis of tables showing a group of particular distributions—called the pairs XOR distribution—defined as follows:

**Definition 1 (XOR distribution table)** *A table that shows the distribution of input XORs and output XORs of all possible pairs of an S-box is called the pairs XOR distribution table of the S-box. In this table, each row corresponds to a particular input XOR, each column corresponds to a particular output XOR, and the entries in the table count the number of possible pairs with such an input XOR and an output XOR.*

Since the pairs XOR distribution in any DES S-box are used for DC attack, some intuitive definitions which measures the level of its resistance against DC attack are necessary. We can consider how many entries appear in the pairs XOR distribution—% of entry, denoted by  $\mu_d$ .

$$\mu_d = \frac{nz}{64 \times 16} \times 100 \quad (1)$$

where  $nz$  denotes the number of non-zero entries in a pairs XOR distribution table. In order to measure how well the values of all entries are distributed from the ideal (uniform) value of entry, the standard deviation,  $\sigma_d$  of all entries can be checked by

$$\sigma_d = \sqrt{\sum_{i=0}^{63} \sum_{j=0}^{15} (e_{ij} - 4)^2 / 64 \times 16}. \quad (2)$$

where  $e_{ij}$  is a measured number of entry in pairs XOR distribution table. We can also check the nontrivial<sup>1</sup> maximum value of entries, denoted by  $\lambda_d$ , in DES S-boxes since the relatively higher valued entries are

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<sup>1</sup>It is trivial that the entry always has a value of 64 when the input XOR and output XOR of any DES-like S-box are zero.

directly employed for DC attack. We simply call these three parameters differential characteristics of an S-box. Differential characteristics of DES S-boxes are measured in Table 2.

Up to now, the 2-round iterative characteristics ( $\Phi \rightarrow 0$  with some prob.  $p$ ) have ever been known to be the basic tool in breaking DES by DC attack. The 2-round iterative characteristic  $\Phi = 1960000_x$  with probability  $\frac{1}{234}$  is found to be close to the best characteristic for attacking the full 16-round DES. We discuss cases where 2-round iterative characteristics occur in DES and suggest an efficient design criterion of DES-like S-boxes which guarantees to exhibit 2-round iterative characteristics with very low probability, *i.e.*, the method to immunize DES against DC attack is to find any necessary condition such that 2-round iterative characteristics exist with more than 3 active S-boxes.

The careful examination of E-expansion of DES F-functions leads us to the following theorem.

**Theorem 1** *For a given DES-like S-box satisfying 6 design criteria, the possibilities that nonzero input XOR with 3 active S-boxes results in the nonzero output XOR is one of the followings :*

A-1  $S(\mathbf{x}) \neq S(\mathbf{x} \oplus (00ef11))$  for any  $e$  and  $f$ .

A-2  $S(\mathbf{x}) \neq S(\mathbf{x} \oplus (10ef00))$  for any  $e$  and  $f$ .

A-3  $S(\mathbf{x}) \neq S(\mathbf{x} \oplus (11ef10))$  for any  $e$  and  $f$ .

If we combine 6 design criteria with A-3, we can obtain the following important theorem to immunize DES against DC attack.

**Theorem 2** *If nonzero input XOR  $\underbrace{00a_1a_2a_3a_4}_1 \underbrace{a_3a_4a_5a_6a_7a_8}_2 \dots \underbrace{a_{n-7}a_{n-6}a_{n-5}a_{n-4}a_{n-3}a_{n-2}}_{l-1}$   $\underbrace{a_{n-3}a_{n-2}a_{n-1}a_n}_l 00$  for each  $n = 4i + 2, (i = 1, \dots, l)$  is given to  $l$  neighbouring DES S-boxes satisfying 6 criteria and A-3, output XOR will never be zero.*

The above theorem means that we can only find 2-round iterative characteristics with 8 active S-boxes, *i.e.*, we cannot find any 2-round iterative characteristics with less than 7 active S-boxes. Combining this theorem with S-5, the necessary condition to immunize DES against DC attack is :

**Condition 1 (D-1)**  $S(\mathbf{x}) \neq S(\mathbf{x} \oplus (11efg0))$  for any  $efg$ .

## 4 Resistance against LC Attack

The following notations are used hereinafter.

- $I_i$  : The input value of  $i$ -th round in DES F-function.
- $O_i$  : The output value of  $i$ -th round in DES F-function.
- $K_i$  : The key value of  $i$ -th round in DES F-function.
- $X[Z] = \bigoplus_{k \in Z} X[k]$ , where  $Z \subset \{0, 1, \dots, 47\}$  and  $X[k]$  is the  $k$ -th bit of  $X$  which is one of  $I_i$ ,  $O_i$  and  $K_i$ .
- $a_x$  : The hexadecimal value of  $a$ .
- $W(\alpha)$  : The Hamming weight of  $\alpha$ .
- For  $x, y \in GF(2)^n$ ,  $x \bullet y$  denotes the dot product of  $x$  and  $y$ .

Kim *et al* [7],[8] have already suggested the necessary condition to design DES-like S-boxes which can be resistant to LC attack. In this section, we will summarize those conditions and revise them by the computer experiments.

## 4.1 Uniformity of a Linear Distribution Table

It is necessary to precompute the linear distribution table of DES-like S-boxes defined as below like DC attack in order to break DES by LC attack.

**Definition 2 (Linear distribution table)** For a given DES S-box  $S$ , we define  $NS(\alpha, \beta)$  as the number of times minus 32 out of 64 input patterns of  $S$ , such that an XORed value of the input bits masked by  $\alpha$  coincides with an XORed value of the output bits masked by  $\beta$ , that is to say,

$$NS(\alpha, \beta) = \#\{x \in GF(2)^6 | x \bullet \alpha = S(x) \bullet \beta\} - 32$$

where  $\alpha \in GF(2)^6$  and  $\beta \in GF(2)^4$ . We refer the complete table for every  $\alpha$  and  $\beta$  to the linear distribution table. For a specific S-box,  $S_i$  ( $i = 1, \dots, 8$ ), we denote its linear distribution table as  $NS_i(\alpha, \beta)$ .

In order to check the uniformity of a linear distribution table of any S-box, let us denote % of the entry by  $\mu_l$  and the maximal entry by  $\lambda_l$  as the same way to check the uniformity of XOR distribution table.

Based on the computer experiments and theoretical analysis, the first necessary condition [8] to make DES-like S-boxes to be immunized against LC attack is :

**Condition 2 (L-1)** The  $\lambda_l$  of any S-box should be less than 16.

## 4.2 Iterative Linear Approximation

The following definitions are necessary to understand the concept of LC attack.

**Definition 3 (Linear approximation)** For a given expression  $I[Z_1] \oplus O[Z_2] = K[Z_3]$  with probability  $p + 1/2$ , this linear approximation is denoted as  $A: I[Z_1], K[Z_3] \rightarrow O[Z_2]$  with  $p$ . We denote this expression as  $A, B, C, \dots$  and sometimes omit the term  $K[Z_3]$ . Also  $\delta(A)$  denotes the set of S-boxes necessary to express  $A$  and  $\#\delta(A) = |\delta(A)|$ .

**Definition 4 (nR iterative linear approximation)** The  $n$ -round (simply,  $nR$ ) iterative linear approximation is defined by  $I_1[Z_1] \oplus I_n[Z_n] = K_2[Z_2] \oplus \dots \oplus K_{n-1}[Z_{n-1}]$ . For the consecutive  $n$ -rounds, the XORed values of  $n-2$  keys in an  $(n-2)$ -round can be expressed by its input and output XORed values. When this expression holds with probability  $q = p + 1/2$ , the probability of this linear approximation is to be  $p$ . Also, we denote  $nR$  iterative linear approximation as  $-A_1 \dots A_{n-2} -$  and its concatenated expression as  $-A_1 \dots A_{n-2} - A_{n-2} \dots A_1 -$ .

To cryptanalyze  $n$ -round DES by LC attack in general, we need to find an useful linear approximation of  $(n-1)$ -round DES. When the linear approximation of  $(n-1)$ -round DES holds with probability  $q = p + \frac{1}{2}$ , the number of plaintexts which the attacker needs are about  $|p|^{-2}$  by Lemma 2 in [6]. Thus, a linear approximation of 15-round DES is necessary to break the full 16-round DES. When this approximation holds with probability  $p_{15}$ , the necessary condition that LC attack is no more efficient than key-exhaustive search is  $p_{15}^{-2} \geq 2^{56}$ , i.e.,  $|p_{15}| \leq 2^{-28}$ . Thus, in order that DES can be resistant to LC attack, the main idea is to find some necessary conditions such that DES-like S-boxes should have any linear approximation with the small probability.

By Lemma 3 in [6], if we find an  $nR$  iterative linear approximation with probability  $p$ , then we can also obtain  $(k \cdot (n - 1) + 1)R$  linear approximation with probability  $2^{k-1}p^k$  when  $nR$  iterative linear approximation is applied  $k$  times. We discuss the necessary condition how to lower the probability of 3R, 4R, and 5R iterative linear approximations to prevent DES from being broken by a successful LC attack.

### 4.2.1 3R Iterative Linear Approximation

The 3R iterative linear approximation has a form of  $I_1[Z_1] \oplus I_3[Z_1] = K_1[Z_2]$ , i.e., there exists a linear correlation between key and output subblocks without input subblock as  $O_i[Z_1] = K_i[Z_2]$ . This case always occurs when two outer bits of a DES S-box are given to two neighbouring S-boxes. Thus, we can build the 3R iterative linear approximation from this case.

**Theorem 3** *There exists a 3R iterative linear approximation if and only if the input of Si-box and the input of S(i+1)-box are  $3_x$  and  $30_x$ , respectively.*

If  $NS_i(3_x, \beta_1)$  and  $NS_{i+1}(30_x, \beta_2)$  are not equal to zero, we can build some 3R iterative linear approximations. From the 3R iterative linear approximation  $-A-$  with probability  $p$ , we can build the 15-round linear approximation like  $-A-A-A-A-A-A-A-$  and the total probability for this approximation to hold is  $2^6 p^7$ . Thus, the necessary condition that this attack is no more efficient than key-exhaustive search is  $2^6 |p|^7 \leq 2^{-28}$ , i.e.,  $|p| \leq 2^{-4.9}$ . In other words,

$$\left| 2 \cdot \frac{NS_i(3_x, \beta_1)}{64} \cdot \frac{NS_{i+1}(30_x, \beta_2)}{64} \right| \leq 2^{-4.9}. \quad (3)$$

If any DES-like S-box satisfies **D-1**, the values of  $NS(30_x, \beta)$  and  $NS(31_x, \beta)$  are to be zero for any  $\beta$  so that the LHS of Eq. (3) is always equal to zero.

**Condition 3 (L-2)**  $S(\mathbf{x}) \neq S(\mathbf{x} \oplus (11efg0))$  for any  $efg$ .

Note that **L-2** is a common design criterion to prevent DES from being broken by successful DC and LC attacks.

#### 4.2.2 4R Iterative Linear Approximation

We discuss cases when a 4R iterative linear approximation occurs from two given linear approximations such as,

$$A : I_2[Z_1], K_2[Z_3] \longrightarrow O_2[Z_2] \quad (4)$$

$$B : I_3[Y_1], K_3[Y_3] \longrightarrow O_3[Y_2] \quad (5)$$

If we linearly approximate the 2nd round and 3rd round function of DES to  $A$  and  $B$ , respectively,  $I_2[Z_1]$  should be equal to the XORed value between the 3rd round output and 4th round input, and  $I_3[Y_1]$  should be equal to the XORed value between the 1st round input and 2nd round output in order to get an useful 4R iterative linear approximation.

**Theorem 4** *By concatenating two linear approximations Eqns. (4) and (5) with probability  $p_1$  and  $p_2$ , respectively, the condition for building a 4R iterative linear approximation is  $Z_1 = Y_2, Z_2 = Y_1$ . Also, the 4R iterative linear approximation is of the form*

$$I_1[Z_2] \oplus I_4[Z_1] = K_2[Z_3] \oplus K_3[Y_3] \quad (6)$$

with probability  $2p_1p_2$ .

If the 4R iterative linear approximation  $-AB-$  with probability  $p$  is given, we can build the 15-round linear approximation as  $-AB-BA-AB-BA-AB$ . The necessary condition that this attack is no more efficient than key-exhaustive search is  $|2^4 p^5| \leq 2^{-28}$ , i.e.,  $|p| \leq 2^{-6.4}$ .

**Condition 4 (L-3)** *The followings (18 cases in total) are necessary so that the 4R iterative linear approximation will not occur.*

- $S1$ -box :  $NS_1(4, 4) = NS_1(2, 2) = 0$ ,     $S2$ -box :  $NS_2(4, 4) = NS_2(2, 1) = 0$
- $S3$ -box :  $NS_3(8, 4) = NS_3(4, 8) = 0$ ,     $S4$ -box :  $NS_4(8, 4) = NS_4(2, 2) = 0$
- $S5$ -box :  $NS_5(16, 1) = NS_5(8, 8) = NS_5(2, 4) = 0$
- $S6$ -box :  $NS_6(16, 4) = NS_6(4, 8) = NS_6(2, 2) = 0$
- $S7$ -box :  $NS_7(4, 8) = NS_7(2, 1) = 0$ ,     $S8$ -box :  $NS_8(16, 1) = NS_8(2, 4) = 0$

When DES-like S-boxes satisfying **L-3** are given, the necessary condition not to find 4R linear approximation is as follows:

**Condition 5 (L-4)** For  $W(\alpha), W(\beta) \leq 2$ ,  $|NS(\alpha, \beta)| \leq 8$  where  $\alpha \in GF(2)^6$  and  $\beta \in GF(2)^4$ .

We, however, have found that it was very difficult to find a set of 8 DES-like S-boxes satisfying **L-4** by computer experiments. Thus we loose the threshold value down to 10 in an empirical way but this would not disturb the strength of new DES-like S-boxes.

**Condition 6 (Revised L-4)** For  $W(\alpha), W(\beta) \leq 2$ ,  $|NS(\alpha, \beta)| \leq 10$  where  $\alpha \in GF(2)^6$  and  $\beta \in GF(2)^4$ .

### 4.2.3 5R Iterative Linear Approximation

The following theorem points us cases where the possible 5R iterative linear approximations occur.

**Theorem 5** When three linear approximations are given by

$$\begin{aligned} A & : I_2[Z_1], K_2[Z_3] \longrightarrow O_2[Z_2] \\ B & : I_3[Y_1], K_3[Y_3] \longrightarrow O_3[Y_2] \\ C & : I_4[X_1], K_4[X_3] \longrightarrow O_4[X_2], \end{aligned}$$

we can obtain a 5R iterative linear approximation only if  $Z_1 = Y_2 = X_1, Y_1 = Z_2 \cup X_2 - Z_2 \cap X_2$ , and the 5R iterative linear expression  $-ABC-$  is of the form

$$I_1[Z_2] \oplus I_5[X_2] = K_2[Z_3] \oplus K_3[Y_3] \oplus K_4[X_3].$$

Using the 5R iterative linear approximation  $-ABC-$ , we can build 15-round linear approximation as  $-ABC - CBA - ABC - DE$ . The probabilities of  $D$  and  $E$  is less than  $2^{-2}$  by **L-1**. If the probability of  $-ABC-$  is  $p$ ,  $|p|^3$  should be less than  $2^{-28}$ , i.e.,  $|p| \leq 2^{-9.4}$ . Some computation leads us that

**Condition 7 (L-5)** For  $\alpha \in GF(2)^6$ ,  $\beta_1$  and  $\beta_2 \in GF(2)^4$ ,  
 $W(\alpha) = 1$  and  $W(\beta_1 \oplus \beta_2) = 1 \implies |NS(\alpha, \beta_1) \cdot NS(\alpha, \beta_2)| \leq 48$ .

We guess that **L-2** causes  $|NS(10_x, \beta_1) \cdot NS(10_x, f_x)| = 16 \times 16 = 256$  for some  $\beta_1 \neq f_x$ . Thus we could not find any DES-like S-boxes satisfying both **L-2** and **L-5**. In order to revise **L-5**, we utilized the property of P-permutation in DES F-function such that :

**Condition 8 (Revised L-5)** If  $\alpha \neq 10_x$ ,

$$|NS(\alpha, \beta_1) \cdot NS(\alpha, \beta_2)| \leq 48$$

for  $W(\alpha) = 1$  and  $W(\beta_1 \oplus \beta_2) = 1$   
 If  $\alpha = 10_x$ ,

$$\begin{aligned} |NS_k(\alpha, \beta_1) \cdot NS_k(\alpha, \beta_2)| & \leq 48 \text{ for } \beta_1 \oplus \beta_2 = 1 \\ |NS_l(\alpha, \beta_1) \cdot NS_l(\alpha, \beta_2)| & \leq 48 \text{ for } \beta_1 \oplus \beta_2 = 4 \end{aligned}$$

for  $k = 5, 8$  and  $l = 6$ .

## 5 Comparison

Using the same method in [3], we have successfully found a set of DES-like S-boxes satisfying additional 5 conditions described in Section 4. In the appendix, we listed a set of DES-like S-boxes for  $s^5DES^2$  which took about a month to generate by Hyundai Axil HWS310 Sparc workstation (22MIPS, 33MHz).

In this Section, we compare the quantitative characteristics of S-boxes in DES and  $s^iDES$  in various points of cryptographic view and evaluate the goodness-of-fit of them.

We checked the nonlinearity of 4 Boolean functions:  $Z_2^6 \rightarrow Z_2$  consisting of an S-box as shown in Table 1. In the output bit column of this table, 4 denotes the most significant location of an output vector and 1 denotes the least significant location of an output vector. It is clear that the nonlinearity of

Table 1: Nonlinearity of S-boxes

Box	DES				$s^2$ DES				$s^3$ DES				$s^5$ DES			
	output bit				output bit				output bit				output bit			
	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4
S1	18	20	22	18	22	20	20	22	16	20	22	20	20	18	20	22
S2	22	20	18	18	24	22	22	22	22	22	20	22	18	20	20	20
S3	18	22	20	18	20	24	22	22	18	22	20	20	22	22	20	18
S4	22	22	22	22	20	22	22	22	18	24	20	20	20	22	18	22
S5	22	20	18	20	22	24	22	24	20	18	18	22	20	22	20	22
S6	20	20	20	20	22	22	20	22	22	20	18	12	20	22	18	20
S7	18	22	14	20	22	20	22	18	22	18	18	16	22	22	20	20
S8	22	20	20	22	22	22	22	22	20	22	22	20	22	20	18	22

Table 2: Differential characteristics of S-boxes

Box	DES			$s^2$ DES			$s^3$ DES			$s^5$ DES		
	$\mu_d$	$\sigma_d$	$\lambda_d$	$\mu_d$	$\sigma_d$	$\lambda_d$	$\mu_d$	$\sigma_d$	$\lambda_d$	$\mu_d$	$\sigma_d$	$\lambda_d$
S1	79.49	3.76	16	84.38	3.44	14	73.54	4.09	20	74.12	4.07	18
S2	78.61	3.83	16	85.25	3.39	14	75.49	3.97	18	73.63	4.07	20
S3	79.69	3.78	16	84.38	3.34	14	73.44	4.12	18	72.85	4.06	20
S4	68.55	4.18	16	83.40	3.54	16	73.44	4.25	20	74.41	4.09	20
S5	76.56	3.86	16	82.91	3.57	16	70.61	4.41	20	74.61	4.07	20
S6	80.47	3.69	16	83.98	3.48	16	71.19	4.30	20	75.98	3.92	18
S7	77.25	3.95	16	81.93	3.62	16	75.39	3.99	20	73.54	4.08	18
S8	77.15	3.82	16	82.81	3.54	16	75.20	4.01	20	75.0	4.04	18

DES S-boxes ranges from 14 to 22, the nonlinearity of  $s^2$ DES and  $s^5$ DES ranges from 18 to 24, and the nonlinearity of  $s^3$ DES varies from 12 to 24. From these observation, we could say that the nonlinearity of DES-like S-boxes is required to be over 18.

We measured the differential characteristics of a S-box as shown in Table 2.

The uniformity of  $s^3$ DES and  $s^5$ DES in XOR distribution tables could be said to be worse than that of DES and  $s^2$ DES but  $s^3$ DES was verified to be stronger than DES and  $s^2$ DES from DC attack. In [13], Seberry *et al* proposed a new measure of checking the robustness of S-box against DC attack. As defined in Section 3, let  $\lambda_d$  denote the largest value in the XOR distribution table of DES-like S-box and N denote the number of nonzero entries in the first column of the table. In either case the value  $2^6$  in the first row is not counted. R-robustness against differential cryptanalysis can be defined by  $R = (1 - \frac{N}{2^6})(1 - \frac{\lambda_d}{2^6})$ . We have checked the R-robustness of DES and  $s^i$ DES as shown in Table 3. All DES-like cryptosystems

Table 3: R-robustness of S-boxes

Box	DES		$s^2$ DES		$s^3$ DES		$s^5$ DES	
	N	R	N	R	N	R	N	R
S1	37	0.316	37	0.329	36	0.301	32	0.359
S2	33	0.363	42	0.269	34	0.337	34	0.322
S3	37	0.316	41	0.280	31	0.371	36	0.301
S4	24	0.469	41	0.270	35	0.312	31	0.354
S5	31	0.387	41	0.270	31	0.355	35	0.312
S6	33	0.363	40	0.281	26	0.408	32	0.359
S7	35	0.340	37	0.316	34	0.322	32	0.359
S8	36	0.328	36	0.328	35	0.312	36	0.314

have the similar value of R-robustness. Thus it is difficult to decide which DES-like cryptosystem can resist harder against DC attack from the uniformity of XOR distribution tables and R-robustness.

The dependence matrix of a DES-like S-box are examined to check if DES-like S-boxes satisfy the SAC (Strict Avalanche Criterion). The dependence matrix  $\mathbf{P} = (p_{i,j})$  of the S-box is defined as follows: The element  $p_{i,j}$  of  $\mathbf{P}$  is the probability that the output variable  $\mathbf{y}_j$  of the S-box changes when the input variable  $\mathbf{x}_i$  is complemented. The average values, *i.e.*,  $(p_{i,1} + p_{i,2} + p_{i,3} + p_{i,4})/4$  of  $(p_{i,j})$  of S-boxes in DES and  $s^i$ DES are compared in Table 4. Whenever one bit of input in  $s^2$ DES is complemented, every

Table 4: Average  $(p_{i,j})$  values of S-boxes

Box	DES	$s^2$ DES	$s^3$ DES	$s^5$ DES
S1	0.620	0.495	0.609	0.633
S2	0.633	0.510	0.609	0.625
S3	0.661	0.505	0.617	0.620
S4	0.615	0.521	0.617	0.617
S5	0.633	0.516	0.617	0.641
S6	0.651	0.516	0.620	0.628
S7	0.656	0.516	0.638	0.630
S7	0.625	0.508	0.625	0.625

output bits can be said to change with close to the probability  $\frac{1}{2}$ . But, the probability of dependence matrix in DES,  $s^3$ DES and  $s^5$ DES is found to have greater value than 0.6. Therefore we can infer that Boolean functions consisting of DES,  $s^3$ DES and  $s^5$ DES do not satisfy the SAC.

Finally we checked the uniformity of linear distribution table of a S-box as shown in Table 5. We

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<sup>2</sup>The name of  $s^4$ DES is skipped with intention since it was distributed in an informal way.



Table 5: Uniformity of Linear distribution table

Box	DES		$s^2$ DES		$s^3$ DES		$s^5$ DES	
	$\mu_l$	$\lambda_l$	$\mu_l$	$\lambda_l$	$\mu_l$	$\lambda_l$	$\mu_l$	$\lambda_l$
S1	75.87	18	77.46	14	62.22	16	68.15	16
S2	69.95	16	77.67	14	68.57	16	68.68	16
S3	77.14	16	79.15	14	68.78	16	71.43	16
S4	58.84	16	75.45	14	65.08	24	71.64	16
S5	75.77	20	74.39	18	71.01	24	72.91	16
S6	76.51	14	78.62	14	69.95	20	72.49	16
S7	75.56	18	76.83	16	73.33	20	71.32	16
S8	73.12	16	77.57	14	70.69	16	71.32	16

can see that there was no design criteria of DES against LC attack but the maximal entry in  $s^5$ DES is restricted being under 16.

Thus we cannot tell which measure is the best to check the immunity of DES-like cryptosystems against DC and LC attack. Further researches on this are required.

## 6 Concluding Remarks

Our empirical approach to immunize DES S-boxes to DC and LC attacks could enhance the security of DES. Our approach is very simple since the current DES S-boxes can be substituted with new S-boxes without changing other components of DES. Even if  $s^5$ DES can be resistant from two robust attacks, the DES key-exhaustive search machine suggested by Wiener[9] can be valid for a successful attack. Against this attack, we can consider that the key scheduling part of DES can be redesigned to increase the current DES key size. But, this is beyond the scope of this research.

At this time, we believe that the complexity of breaking  $s^5$ DES is similar to that of  $s^3$ DES by DC attack and the complexity of breaking  $s^5$ DES is similar to that of  $s^2$ DES by LC attack. Since **Condition 1** has been proved to be the simple and powerful means against DC attack,  $s^5$ DES can be more resistant than DES from DC attack. In [15], the complexity of breaking  $s^5$ DES by LC attack has described in detail.

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**Appendix:** 8  $s^5$ DES S-boxes

S1-box															
9	10	15	1	4	7	2	12	6	5	3	14	8	11	13	0
2	13	8	4	11	1	14	7	12	3	15	9	5	6	0	10
10	12	4	7	9	2	15	1	3	6	13	8	14	5	0	11
4	11	1	13	14	7	8	2	10	0	6	3	9	12	15	5

S2-box															
6	3	5	0	8	14	11	13	9	10	12	7	15	4	2	1
9	6	10	12	15	0	5	3	4	1	7	11	2	13	14	8
5	8	3	14	6	13	0	11	10	15	9	2	12	1	7	4
6	3	15	9	0	10	12	5	13	8	2	4	11	7	1	14

S3-box															
11	5	8	2	6	12	1	15	7	14	13	4	0	9	10	3
7	8	1	14	11	2	13	4	12	3	6	9	5	15	0	10
8	11	1	12	15	6	2	5	4	7	10	9	3	0	13	14
13	2	4	7	1	11	14	8	10	9	15	0	12	6	3	5

S4-box															
13	11	8	14	3	0	6	5	4	7	2	9	15	12	1	10
10	0	3	5	15	6	12	9	1	13	4	14	8	11	2	7
6	5	11	8	0	14	13	3	9	12	7	2	10	1	4	15
9	12	5	15	6	3	0	10	7	11	2	8	13	4	14	1

S5-box															
12	6	2	11	5	8	15	1	3	13	9	14	0	7	10	4
15	0	12	5	3	6	9	10	4	11	2	8	14	1	7	13
1	12	15	5	6	11	8	2	4	7	10	9	13	0	3	14
6	3	10	0	9	12	5	15	13	4	1	14	7	11	8	2

S6-box															
14	8	2	5	9	15	4	3	7	1	12	6	0	10	11	13
1	13	11	8	2	4	7	14	10	6	0	15	5	9	12	3
4	2	9	15	14	8	3	5	10	7	0	12	13	1	6	11
8	11	7	4	13	1	14	2	5	0	9	10	6	15	3	12

S7-box															
4	13	10	3	7	0	9	14	2	1	15	6	12	11	5	8
9	0	15	10	12	6	5	3	14	7	1	13	11	8	2	4
13	10	3	9	0	7	14	4	8	6	5	12	11	1	2	15
10	3	12	6	5	9	0	15	4	8	11	1	14	7	13	2

S8-box															
1	10	2	12	15	9	4	7	14	3	5	0	8	6	11	13
14	13	7	11	2	4	1	8	0	10	9	6	5	15	12	3
10	15	12	1	9	2	7	4	13	0	6	11	3	5	8	14
4	8	1	2	7	11	13	14	10	5	15	12	0	6	3	9