


Basic Security Requirements



Basic Security Requirements


- *Confidentiality* : keeping information secret from all but those who are authorized to it.
- *Data integrity* : ensuring information has not been altered by unauthorized or unknown means
- *Authentication*
 - ✓ *Entity authentication (or identification)* : corroboration of the identity of an entity (e.g., a person, a computer terminal, etc)
 - ✓ *Message authentication: corroboration the source of information ; also known as data origin authentication*
- *Access control*: restricting access to resources to privileged entities.
- *Non-repudiation*: preventing the denial of previous commitment or actions.

Advanced Security Requirements

- **Authorization:** conveyance, to another entity, of official sanction to do or be something.
- **Validation:** a means to provide timeliness of authorization to use or manipulate information or services
- **Certification:** endorsement of information by a trusted entity
- **Revocation:** retraction of certification or authorization
- **Time stamping:** recording the time of creation or existence of information
- **Witnessing:** verifying the creation or existence of information by an entity other than the creator
- **Receipt:** acknowledgement that information has been received
- **Ownership:** a means to provide an entity with the legal right to use or transfer a resource to others
- **Anonymity:** concealing the identity of an entity involved in some process


□3

What is Network Security ?




□4

Network Security Model



7 Sins in Cyberspace



Risk analysis in Cyberspace

Risks	Type of Intrusion	Problem	Countermeasures
Theft or Stolen	Confidentiality Authentication	Device holders have authentication information	Entity (or device) authentication/Cryptography
Illegal Access Point	Authentication	1-way authentication	Mutual authentication
IP Spoofing	Confidentiality	Radiation of RF signal to unwanted user	Cryptography
(D)DoS	Availability	Degraded availability	Availability
Trojan Horse, Worm, Virus	Availability, Confidentiality, Integrity	Degraded availability & integrity	Anti-Virus program
Attack by harmful signal	Availability	Interfered communication channel	Spread Spectrum-Frequency Hopping
Resource consumption attack	Availability	Out of battery power	Availability
Revealing Location or ID- information	Confidentiality	Privacy	Anonymity

□7


Example of Security Engineering in a Network

Security requirement	Special Requirement in U-network	
Basic	Authentication	Mutual authentication, use of dynamic key, Wireless PKI, device authentication, Central authentication, QoS
	Confidentiality	Key management, light weight cryptography, secure DB, mobile cryptography
	Integrity	Integrity mechanism for U-network
Additional	Availability	DoS attack, Priority management in access control, Differentiated service
	Control of delegate	Entity authentication and authorization Access control
	Anonymity	Transfer of real ID information
	Safe roaming	Global roaming, DRM, Seamless secure roaming

□8

Introduction to Cryptography

Model of Symmetric Cryptosystem



Terminology (I)

- Channel
 - Secure : trust, registered mail, tamper-proof device
 - Insecure : open, public channel
- Entity
 - Sender (Alice)
 - Receiver (Bob)
 - Adversary (Charlie)
 - ✓ Passive attack : wiretapping -> Privacy
 - ✓ Active attack : modification, impersonation
 - > Authentication


□11

Terminology (II)

- Classification of crypto algorithms
 - by date
 - ✓ Traditional(~19C): Caesar
 - ✓ Mechanical(WW I, II): Rotor Machine, Purple
 - ✓ Modern('50~): DES, IDEA, AES and RSA, ECC
 - by number of keys
 - ✓ Conventional: {1, single, common} key, symmetric
 - ✓ Public key cryptosystem: {2, dual} keys, asymmetric
 - by size of plaintext
 - ✓ Block Cipher
 - ✓ Stream Cipher

□12

A Taxonomy of Cryptographic Primitives




RNG(Random Number Generator), PUF(Physically Unclonable Function)

Classification of Security


- Unconditionally secure : unlimited power of adversary, perfect (ex. : one-time pad)
- Provably secure : under the assumption of well-known hard mathematical problem
- Computationally secure : amount of computational effort by the best known methods (*Practical Secure*)

History of Modern Cryptography



Key Distribution Problem


- ❖ In symmetric key cryptosystems
- ❖ Over complete graph with n nodes, $nC_2 = n(n-1)/2$ pairs secret keys are required.
- ❖ (Example) $n=100$, $99 \times 50 = 4,950$ keys are required
- ❖ Problem: Managing large number of keys and keeping them in a secure manner is difficult



Secret keys are required between
 $(a,b), (a,c), (a,d), (a,e), (b,c),$
 $(b,d), (b,e), (c,d), (c,e), (d,e)$

PKC – concept (1/3)

Using a pair of keys which have special mathematical relation.
Each user needs to keep securely only his private key.
All public keys of users are published.



In Encryption


Anyone can lock (using the **public key**)
Only the receiver can unlock (using the **private key**)

In Digital Signature

Only the signer can sign (using the **private key**)
Anyone can verify (using the **public key**)

PKC – concept (2/3)


- ❖ **Trapdoor one-way functions**
 - ❖ Given x , easy to compute $f(x)$
 - ❖ Given y , difficult to compute $f^{-1}(y)$ in general
 - ❖ Easy to compute $f^{-1}(y)$ for given y to only who knows certain information (which we call trapdoor information)



But, easy if trapdoor info. is given.

PKC – concept (3/3)

- ❖ Concept
 - invented by Diffie and Hellman in 1976, “New directions In Cryptography”, IEEE Tr. on IT., Vol. 22, pp. 644-654, Nov. 1976.
 - Overcome the problem of secret key sharing in symmetric cryptosystems
 - Two keys used: public key & private key
 - Also known as two-key or asymmetric cryptography
 - Based on (trapdoor) one-way function



But, easy if trapdoor info. is given.

□19

PKC- operations

- PKC-encryption/decryption
 - Bob (Plaintext M) → Alice's Public Key → Alice (CipherText C) → Alice's Private Key → Alice (Plaintext M)
- PKC- digital signature
 - Bob (Plaintext M) → Bob's private Key → Bob (Message + Signature $M + s$) → Authentic channel → Alice (Message + Signature $M + s$) → Bob's public Key → Alice (Yes / No)

□20

Examples of PKC

- ❖ RSA scheme (1978)
- ❖ *R.L.Rivest, A.Shamir, L.Adleman, "A Method for Obtaining Digital Signatures and Public Key Cryptosystems", CACM, Vol.21, No.2, pp.120-126, Feb, 1978*
- ❖ McEliece scheme (1978)
- ❖ Rabin scheme (1979)
- ❖ Knapsack scheme (1979-): Merkle-Hellman, Chor-Rivest, etc.
- ❖ ElGamal scheme (1985)
- ❖ Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem (1985): Koblitz, Miller
- ❖ Non-Abelian group Cryptography (2000): Braid group

Pros and Cons

	Symmetric	Asymmetric
Key relation	Enc. key = Dec. key	Enc. Key ≠ Dec. key
Enc. Key	Secret	Public, {Private}
Dec. key	Secret	Private, {Public}
Algorithm	Classified	Open
Example	SKIPJACK	RSA
Key Distribution	Required (X)	Not required (O)
Number of key	Many (X)	Small (O)
Performance	Fast(O)	Slow(X)

Hash Function

❖ Definition


- Compression: arbitrary length input to fixed length output
- Ease of computation

❖ Security Properties

- **Preimage resistance** (One-wayness) :
 - Given y , it is computationally infeasible to find any input x such that $y = h(x)$
- **2nd preimage resistance** (Weak collision resistance) :
 - Given x , it is computationally infeasible to find another input $x' \neq x$ such that $h(x) = h(x')$
- **Collision resistance** (Strong collision resistance) :
 - It is computationally infeasible to find any two distinct inputs x and x' such that $h(x) = h(x')$

□23

Construction of Secure Hash Function



□24

Secure Hash Algorithm

Algorithm and variant	Output size (bits)	Internal state size (bits)	Block size (bits)	Max message size (bits)	Word size (bits)	Rounds	Operation	Collisions found
SHA-0	160	160	512	$2^{64} - 1$	32	80	+ , and , or , xor , rot	Yes
SHA-1	160	160	512	$2^{64} - 1$	32	80	+ , and , or , xor , rot	Yes (2 ⁵² attack (*)
SHA-256/224	256/224	256	512	$2^{64} - 1$	32	64	+ , and , or , xor , shr , rot	None
SHA-512/384	512/384	512	1024	$2^{128} - 1$	64	80	+ , and , or , xor , shr , rot	None

* Cameron McDonald, Philip Hawkes and Josef Pieprzyk, SHA-1 collisions now 2⁵², Eurocrypt 2009 Rump session, <http://eurocrypt2009rump.cr.yt/837a0a8086fa6ca714249409dfdae43d.pdf>.

Collision in MD5

□Collision1.bin

```

C:\Users\user> md5sum collision1.bin
e8b2c4b893127701c5f287159b14251
collision1.bin
2802 bytes, 0 ms = 0.00 MB/sec
  
```

□Collision2.bin

```

C:\Users\user> md5sum collision2.bin
e8b2c4b893127701c5f287159b14251
collision2.bin
2802 bytes, 0 ms = 0.00 MB/sec
  
```

```

Use of md5sum.exe: the command
md5sum -b-s collision1.bin collision2.bin
should produce the following output:

MD5sum 1.2.4 (https://www.pc-tools.net/)
Copyright (C) 2001-2005 Jan Bovykes - http://www.pc-tools.net/
collision1.bin
collision2.bin
2802 bytes, 0 ms = 0.00 MB/sec
  
```

□Same MD5 Hashed Value !!

SHA-3 Project

NIST National Institute of Standards and Technology
Information Technology Laboratory

Computer Security Division
Computer Security Resource Center

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CRYPTOGRAPHIC HASH PROJECT

Background Information

A hash function takes binary data, called the message, and produces a condensed representation called the message digest. A cryptographic hash function is a hash function that is designed to achieve certain security properties. The [Federal Information Processing Standard 180-2, Secure Hash Standard](#), specifies algorithms for computing five cryptographic hash functions — SHA-1, SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512. FIPS 180-2 was issued in August, 2002, superseding FIPS 180-1.

In recent years, several of the non-NIST approved cryptographic hash functions have been successfully attacked, and serious attacks have been published against SHA-1. In response, NIST held two public workshops (see menu at left) to assess the status of its approved hash functions and to solicit public input on its cryptographic hash function policy and standard. As a result of these workshops, NIST has decided to develop one or more additional hash functions through a public competition. The [Advanced Encryption Standard \(AES\)](#), NIST has proposed a timeline for the competition, and also published a [policy on the use of the current hash functions](#).

NIST issued [draft minimum acceptability requirements](#), submission guidelines, and a [call for candidates](#) for a new cryptographic hash algorithm in January, 2007 [Federal Register Notice (January 23, 2007)] for public comments; the comment period ended on April 27, 2007. Based on the public feedback, NIST has revised the requirements and evaluation criteria and issued a [Call for a New Cryptographic Hash Algorithm \(SHA-3 Family\)](#) on November 2, 2007 [Federal Register Notice (November 2, 2007)] to launch the hash algorithm competition. Details of the competition are available at www.nist.gov/hash-competition.

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Last updated: December 10, 2008
Page created: April 15, 2005

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Key Length by NIST

Date	Minimum of Strength	Symmetric Algorithms	Asymmetric Key	Discrete Logarithm Group	Elliptic Curve	Hash (A)	Hash (B)
2007 - 2010	80	2TDEA*	1024	160	160	SHA-1** SHA-224 SHA-256 SHA-384 SHA-512	SHA-1 SHA-224 SHA-256 SHA-384 SHA-512
2011 - 2030	112	3TDEA	2048	2048	224	SHA-224 SHA-256 SHA-384 SHA-512	SHA-1 SHA-224 SHA-256 SHA-384 SHA-512
> 2030	128	AES-128	3072	256	256	SHA-256 SHA-384 SHA-512	SHA-1 SHA-224 SHA-256 SHA-384 SHA-512
>> 2030	192	AES-192	7680	384	384	SHA-384 SHA-512	SHA-224 SHA-256 SHA-384 SHA-512
>>> 2030	256	AES-256	15360	512	512	SHA-512	SHA-256 SHA-384 SHA-512

[Recommendation for Key Management](#), Special Publication 800-57 Part 1, [NIST](#), 03/2007.
<http://www.keylength.com>

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