Design of Secure VoIP using ID-Based Cryptosystem

Kyusuk Han * Chan Yeob Yeun * Kwangjo Kim *

Abstract— SIP message authentication and SRTP key agreement are the important issue in the SIP-based VoIP service. Several secure solutions such as HTTP Digest Authentication, SSL/TLS, and S/MIME, are used for the SIP message authentication and key agreement. When the VoIP is used in the wireless environments, the efficiency of security service is one of the important matters in question. Therefore, we would like to propose efficient ID-based cryptosystem for the VoIP. In this paper, we present the application of ID-based cryptosystem for the SIP message authentication as well as the authenticated one-way key agreement for SRTP. Our novel design reduces delaying for the key generation and provides the explicit mutual authentication.

Keywords: VoIP, ID-based Cryptosystem, Authentication, Key Agreement

1 Introduction

Voice over internet protocol (VoIP) is becoming more common and widely used everywhere, where the various security shortcomings are frequently incurring: Session initiation protocol (SIP) [11] message forgery during SIP transaction and eavesdropping Secure real-time transport protocol (SRTP) [2] packet are critical security problems in the SIP based VoIP services.

Currently, HTTP digest authentication between VoIP user and servers, SSL/TLS among servers, and S/MIME for the message authentication are the solutions for the security of VoIP services.

There are several approaches that consist of the SIP message authentication are shown in the VoIP systems as follows. At first, RFC 4474 [9] defines the VoIP server of user side signs the SIP message, when users send their SIP messages to the VoIP server, the server sign the messages. Users do not provide the security of SIP message. However there are too much overhead in the server with the large number of SIP transactions.

The second approach is signing by users themselves. In this case, users ought to posses the enough computational power with the certificate management. In addition, Kong et al. [7] proposed the scheme that users create their own public key pairs and the servers share the information of the public key.

Therefore, we consider the certificate-less environments with the employment of ID-based cryptography. In 2006, Ring et al. [10], proposed the authentication and key agreement protocol for the VoIP employing ID-based cryptography. Their design is based on two-pass key agreement protocol with signatures and it takes relatively much time for verifying the signature in ID-based cryptography that may occur the delay in key generation in their design.

In this paper, we present the application of ID-based cryptosystem for the SIP message authentication as well as the authenticated one-
way key agreement for SRTP. Our novel design reduces delaying for the key generation and provides the explicit mutual authentication.

2 Related Works

2.1 VoIP security

For the authentication, SIP presently uses HTTP digest authentication [6], which does not provide message integrity, end-to-end security, and has lack of scalability to multi-domain because of the shared user password based model.

Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) [1] is a protocol that adds digital signatures and encryption to Internet MIME (Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions) messages described in RFC 1521 [4]. SIP allows sections of the messages to be encrypted using S/MIME, however S/MIME is dependent upon a Certificate Authority (CA) and accompanying Public Key Infrastructure (PKI), and therefore limited by the adoption of such a system. Also, it is possible that S/MIME is likely to be too heavy for resource constrained handsets.

The model in the RFC 4474 [9] defines the server signs user address binding and contact address with own domain certificate. In this model, users do not have to keep their own certificate and allow user’s message authentication in the outside of the user domain. In this case, the public key is not used by every user so that the delegation of signature generation is required for the practical solution.

However, the message signing in the environment with the large number of user will be the server’s overhead. When a great number of transaction happens, the server might be vulnerable against DoS attack. Furthermore, the computational power of mobile devices are continually being improved.

Kong et al. [7] proposed the model that users sign their own SIP messages with their public keys. Users self-generate public key pairs and register them to their registered VoIP server, and sign the SIP message with the private key. In the mobile environments, generating public key pairs and registering them to servers will be the computational overhead.

They showed their model is efficient because of the overhead from the message signing is distributed to each user. However, their model still have the overhead from the public key registration to all servers. Since the public key pairs are self-generated by each user, the cost to register the public key pairs to all servers should not be ignored.

![Figure 1: User signs own SIP message (ID-based cryptography)](image)

Generic public key cryptosystem requires the verification of the public key in the certificate, and the communication with the trusted third party (TTP), whom the servers role in [7]. Also, each user has to manage other user’s public key.

In this paper, we propose an efficient and practical secure VoIP service with applying ID-based cryptography. We address the combination of the signature scheme in [5] and the key agreement scheme in [8]. With such combination, we achieve the one way authenticated key agreement for the SRTP as well as the message integrity and authentication for the SIP. Using ID-based cryptosystem, user has the benefit from the removing of public key verification. Also we would like to discuss Ring et al. [10]’s design with our proposed protocol.

2.2 ID-based signature scheme

In this section, we describe the scheme 1 in [5], which is used in our VoIP design.
At first, we define $h : \{0, 1\}^* \times V \rightarrow (\mathbb{Z}/l\mathbb{Z})^\times$, $H : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow G^*$, where $G^* := G \setminus \{0\}$. ID-based signature scheme consists of 4 algorithms, Setup, Extract, Sign, and Verify, and 3 entities, the trusted authority (TA), the signer, and the verifier.

**Setup:** TA select a random integer $t \in (\mathbb{Z}/l\mathbb{Z})^\times$, computes $Q_{TA} = tP$, where $t$ remains secret. And then, TA publishes $Q_{TA}$.

**Extract:** The signers request own private keys $S_{ID} = tH(ID)$ to TA, where $ID$ is signers’ identities.

**Sign:** To sign the SIP message $m$. The signer selects arbitrary length $P_1 \in G^*$ and a random integer $k \in (\mathbb{Z}/l\mathbb{Z})^\times$, and computes followings;

1. $r = e(P_1, P)^k$
2. $v = h(m, r)$
3. $u = vS_{ID} + kP_1$

**Verify:** The verifier receives the message $m$ and the signature $(u, v)$, computes followings;

1. $r = e(u, P) \cdot e(H(ID), -Q_{TA})^v$
2. Accepts if and only if $v = h(m, r)$

### 2.3 ID-based Key Agreement Scheme

Assume two entities $A$ and $B$ who exchange the key, where $A$ requests the key exchange. Three methods can be used: Non-interective, Two-pass, and One-way. We focus on two-pass and one-way method here.

**Two-pass** method, which $A$ and $B$ mutually exchange key generating information. Ring et al.’s model [10] is based on the two-pass key agreement protocol, which is shown in Figure 2.

Another way is One-way method, which $A$ sends key generating information and encrypted message using the session key to $B$ at the same time. In this model, the communication is required only once.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alice</th>
<th>Proxies</th>
<th>Bob</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| INVITE, Sign(TA, To, From,...) | OK, Sign(TB, To, From, ...)

Figure 2: Ring et al.’s Key Agreement Model for SIP [10]

To reduce the delay from computing the session key used for SRTP encryption, we use the one-way key agreement model. The example is shown in Figure 3.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Alice</th>
<th>Proxies</th>
<th>Bob</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| INVITE, Sign(TA, To, From,...) | OK, Sign(To, From, ...)

Figure 3: Our proposed Key Agreement Model for SIP

Figure 4 shows the comparison of our one-way key agreement and two-pass key agreement [10] employing in VoIP.

As shown in Figure 4, Alice can pre-compute the session key when she send the INVITE message to Bob. When Alice and Bob agreed to the session key and send SRTP transaction, they can reduce the delay, which is shown in two-pass model. In two-pass model, Alice can compute the session key after Bob responds with OK message. In practical VoIP application, employing our model, the delay is reduced.

For the one-way key agreement protocol, we apply the scheme 1 in [8], which is one-way method. The protocol is as following.

We assume two entities $A$ and $B$ in the protocol. $S_A$ denote the private key of $A$, which
is $sH(ID_A)$, where $s$ is the master secret of KGC. $H(ID_A)$ is $A$’s public key, where $H$ is the hash function, $H : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow G_1$, $G_1$ is additive cyclic group. $ID_A$ is the identity of $A$. Please refer to [3] for the bilinear maps from elliptic curve pairings.

Parameter Distribution: $A$ selects a random integer $r \in Z_q^*$ and computes $X_A = rH(ID_A)$. $A$ sends $X_A$ to $B$ via the public channel.

Established Key: $A$ and $B$ computes followings;

- **$A$:** $k_{AB} = e(S_A, H(ID_B))^r \oplus e(S_A, H(ID_B))$
- **$B$:** $k_{BA} = e(X_A, S_B) \oplus e(H(ID_A), S_B)$.

$\oplus$ denotes XOR operation.

3 Proposed Scheme

We assume a sender $A$, a receiver $B$, and a server in a certain VoIP service. The sender and the receiver generate messages for VoIP service, as clients, while the server provides VoIP service.

To generate SIP message, the sender (denote $A$) generates followings;

- $r = e(P_1, P)^k$
- $t = H^*(r) \cdot H(ID_A)$
- $v = h(m, t)$

Here, $h : \{0, 1\}^* \times G_1 \rightarrow (Z/lZ)^*$, $H : \{0, 1\}^* \rightarrow G_1$, and others follow [5]. To generates $t$, $r$ should be transformed from elliptic curve to finite fields. $H^*$ is a map-to-point hash function, which $H^* : G_2 \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$. To compute with $H(ID_A)$, the transformation is necessary. $e : G_1 \times G_1 \rightarrow G_2$. $G_1$ is cyclic additive group, generated by $P$ with order $q$. $G_2$ is cyclic multiplicative group with the same prime order $q$.

$d_A$ denotes $A$’s private key, $d_A = sH(ID_A)$. $m$ is the SIP message, which includes the sender’s address, the receiver’s address, message generated time, Session Description Protocol (SDP) and other necessary information.

Then, $A$ sends $(u, v) \in (G, (Z/lZ)^*)$ to the receiver $B$.

After receiving $(u, v)$, $B$ generates the following.

$t = H^*(r) \cdot H(ID_A) = H^*(e(u, P) \cdot e(H(ID_A), -sP)^r) \cdot H(ID_A)$.

After that, $A$ and $B$ generate the session key simultaneously.

- $A : k_{AB} = e(d_A, H(ID_B))^H(r) \oplus e(d_A, H(ID_B))$
- $B : k_{BA} = e(t, d_B) \oplus e(H(ID_A), d_B)$.

The correctness of $k_{AB} = k_{BA}$ follows [8].

Therefore, $r$ can be used for both SIP message signature and the key generation, which reduces the additional communication only for the key generation.

$\oplus$ is the additive operation in $G_2$. When the hash function $H^* : G_2 \rightarrow \{0, 1\}$ is used, $\oplus$ can be XOR operation in $k_{BA} = H(e(t, d_B)) \oplus H^*(e(H(ID_A), d_B))$.

4 Security Analysis

We describe the security analysis for our secure VoIP design as follows.

4.1 Security in SIP message authentication

The security in SIP message authentication is the same as the security in [5]. When the
attack is succeed, the Diffie-Hellman problem is solved. However, the DH problem is known as the mathematical hard problem. It is also secure against Man-in-the-middle attack due to the explicit digital signature scheme is applied. Therefore, we also achieve the authenticated one-way key agreement.

4.2 Security in SRTP key generation

For the key generation protocol in [8] is followings.

- **Known-key security** The session key in each session should be independent. When the session key is leaked, it should not threat the other session keys.

- **Unknown key share** When \( A \) and \( B \) exchange the session key, The other entity \( C \) is not exchanging the key.

- **Key control** No entity should not use the previous parameter for the session key.

- **Sender’s key-compromise impersonation** When the private key of \( A \) is leaked, the attacker can impersonate \( A \), but not other entities.

- **Sender’s forward security** When \( A \)’s private key is leaked, the security of previous session has guaranteed.

- **Random number compromise security** The leakage of the certain parameters selected by \( A \) doesn’t affect to the leakage of \( A \)’s private key or session key.

4.2.1 Known-key security

To generate \( r \), where \( r = e(P_1, P)^k \), the sender randomly choose \( P_1 \) and \( k \) in each session. The leakage of \( P_1 \) or \( k \) doesn’t affects the previous session.

4.2.2 Unknown key-share

To generate to key the receiver \( B \) verifies the signature of the sender \( A \) first. Also, the sender self-generates the session key without any information from the receiver. Therefore, Any other entities except \( A \) and \( B \) cannot exchange the key. To succeed the attack, the adversary should be able to generate the signature of \( A \) or know the private key of \( B \).

4.2.3 Key control

Since the key generating parameter \( t \) is selected by \( A \), and the process is done in one-way, \( B \) cannot control the session key, also it is difficult for \( A \) to pre-compute the random integer \( r \) and the generator \( P_1 \) to control \( t \).

4.2.4 Random number compromise

The random integer \( r \) is easily known from \((u, v)\). However it is difficult know \( A \) and \( B \)’s private keys or session key from public parameters \( P, sP, \) and \( r \). To attack the session key, The knowledge of \( A \) or \( B \)’s private key is necessary. The success of attack with \( P, sP \) and \( r \) is the same as the success of attack on the signature.

4.2.5 Attacks on sender

When \( A \)’s private key is leaked, the adversary can impersonate \( A \), since \( r \) is known to \( A \), while it is not possible to impersonate other entity. However, sender’s forward security is not guaranteed unlike [8], since \( r \) is sent with the signature.

4.3 Efficiency

Signature generation requires one exponentiation operation in \( G_2 \), two hash operations, two multiplication in \( G_1 \). Verification requires one exponentiation operation in \( G_2 \), two pairing operations, and one multiplication operation. When the several messages are sent by the same identity, the sender pre-compute \( e(H(ID), -sP) \) to reduce one pairing operation. For the key generation, one pairing operation of the sender, one multiplication over elliptic curve, one exponentiation operation, and two pairing operation of the receiver.

When we apply to SIP message, two exponentiation, three multiplication, two pairing in
the sender side, three pairing and two exponentiation operation in the receiver side.

Using one-way key agreement with signature, we can reduce the delay using two-pass key agreement.

5 Conclusion

In this paper, we proposed the efficient and practical method for the SIP message authentication with signature and authenticated one-way key agreement for SIP-based VoIP service with ID-based cryptosystem. In conclusion, our new approaches can reduce the cost for the public key management, and additional process for the key generation with re-using the parameter for the signature verification. Our related results in this paper are published as a part of [12].

References


