



DDoS Self-Defense

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State of DDoS A&D

Attacks

- Dozens of attack tools, methods
 - Some more effective than others
 - Readily-available to script kiddies
- Constantly happening, but not often in the news
- Typical attack targets:
 - IRC servers
 - Small business
 - Gaming sites
 - Rival botnets
 - Whitehats
- Defenses
 - Commercial solutions available for \$\$\$ ($\forall \forall \forall \forall$)
 - Few alternative options other than "suffer through it"



DDoS Self-Defense

- Other options are in fact available, just not widely known or used
 - Countermeasures may be in legal grey-area
 - Difficulty in quickly bootstrapping defenses during an attack
 - Difficulty in quickly locating contacts/resources who can assist with defense
- Solution (and purpose of this talk)
 - Review legal issues around network self-defense
 - Understand active and passive network self-defense techniques
 - Find out about whitehat communities and build contacts



- Many attacks are HTTP-based resource exhaustion attacks
 - Synfloods not always effective against targets since servers/network providers have gotten better at dealing with them
 - Instead of "filling up the pipe", it's easier to overload the webserver's max connections or available CPU/memory resources
- Most HTTP-based attacks launched in a userspace process, therefore:
 - Must use the system TCP/IP stack
 - Are limited by the rules implemented by the TCP/IP stack
 - We can take advantage of this



- On DDoS victim server:
 - Identify and handle attacker connections
 - Immediately set TCP window size to few or zero bytes
 - Send no more packets, forget about the connection
- On attacker bot machine:
 - Stack must obey the TCP window size setting and sends no more data than will fit in the window before receiving an ACK
 - Since no ACK ever comes, attacker tries to resend request no larger than the window size at ever-increasing intervals forever or until bot kills the connection
- Traffic destined to victim is significantly decreased



Bot Throughput During DDoS





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Bot CPU Load During DDoS





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- Software for tarpitting
 - LaBrea by Tom Liston
 - No longer distributed by Tom
 - Source code available from other sites
 - Linux Netfilter
 - iptables -A INPUT -s x.x.x.x -p tcp -j TARPIT
- Further reading
 - The University of Florida used tarpitting to defend against NetSky worm DDoS attack in 2004:
 - http://nersp.nerdc.ufl.edu/~oitnews/2004_06/tarpit.html
 - http://psifertex.com/download/Jordan_Wiens_GCIH.pdf



Browser-Based Attacks

- Often used during "hacktivist" activities
- No botnet required
 - HTML/javascript page distributed to willing attackers
 - Script continually reloads pages/images from victim website
 - Easy to deploy
 - Download and edit HTML page to add targets
 - Hand it out in a forum with simple instructions: "open this in your browser and let it run"
- Example: Lad Vampire
 - originally written to attack phishing pages by anti-phishing-fraud vigilante group
 - No longer distributed by same group, but still in active circulation



Lad Vampire in Action





Cache prevention

GET /images/bg.jpg?1264undefined HTTP/1.1 Accept: */* Accept-Language: en-us Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Windows NT 5.1; SV1) Host: joestewart.org **Connection:** Keep-Alive



RewriteEngine on RewriteCond %{QUERY_STRING} ^[0-9]+undefined RewriteRule /.*\.(jpg|gif)\$ /cgi-bin/log.cgi



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/cgi-bin/log.cgi

```
#!/usr/bin/perl
use GD::Simple;
my \$i = GD::Simple->new(130, 90);
$i->bgcolor('red'); $i->fgcolor('black');
$i->rectangle(1,1,129,89);$i->moveTo(20,30);
$i->string('Your IP address');$i->moveTo(25,40);
$i->string($ENV{'REMOTE_ADDR'});$i->moveTo(20,50);
$i->string('has been logged');$i->moveTo(5,60);
$i->string('and will be reported');$i->moveTo(10,70);
$i->string('to the authorities.');
print "Content-Type: image/png\n\n";
print $i->png;
```



Lad Vampire Mitigation Result





- With cooperation, it is possible to locate and take down (or take over) control servers for DDoS malware
- Need to establish contact with helpful persons in different business sectors:
 - ISPs
 - Knowing the target IP and network traffic type, ISPs can find infected customers and use network flow triangulation to find the common control server IP
 - Some security monitoring companies have access to similar data
 - Antivirus researchers
 - Knowing the fingerprint of the attack software may enable them to find the actual malware sample that is being used in the attack
 - Replaying the sample in a sandnet can reveal the control server IP



Active Defense: Takedown or Takeover?

- We have the IP of the controller, now what?
- Takedown may not be desirable
 - Losing connectivity with the controller may not cause the bots to stop attacking, in fact it could prolong an attack
 - Depending on the bot, a backup hostname could be in use, so the attacker is back up and running in minutes
 - Finding all backup names and IP addresses involved is crucial
- Takeover
 - Many bot types have no way to authenticate the controller
 - As long as it speaks the right protocol, the bots will obey
 - With cooperation from DNS or hosting provider, bots can be instructed to stop the attack before the final takedown



Active Defense: Becoming the Controller

- Black Energy
 - Very popular DDoS bot
 - No authentication of controller
 - Stop command:

10;2000;10;0;0;30;100;40;20;1000;2000#stop#1#xCOMP_ABCD1234

- Illusion Bot
 - Somewhat less popular DDoS bot
 - No authentication of controller
 - Stop command: 100 @stopall



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```
GET http://example.com//~/~/~/~// HTTP/1.1
Host: example.com
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 5.5; Windows 98)
Refer: http://example.com/cgi-bin/index.pl
GET http://example.com/1.php HTTP/1.1
Host: example.com
Accept: */*
User-Agent: Microsoft-WebDAV-MiniRedir/5.1.2600
Refer: http://example.com/index.html
```

Referrer header is spelled the wrong "wrong" way



GET / HTTP/1.1 Accept: image/gif, image/x-xbitmap, image/jpeg, image/pjpeg, application/x-shockwave-flash, application/vnd.ms-excel, application/vnd.ms-powerpoint, application/msword, application/x-msapplication, application/x-ms-xbap, application/vnd.ms-xpsdocument, application/xaml+xml, */* Accept-Language: ko UA-CPU: x86 Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate User-Agent: %s 🗕 User-Agent selected at random... Host: [target hostname] **Connection: Keep-Alive**



Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1; GTB6; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729)

Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1; Trident/4.0; GTB6; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729)

Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 7.0; Windows NT 5.1; InfoPath.2; MAXTHON 2.0)

Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 8.0; Windows NT 5.1; Trident/4.0; GTB6; .NET CLR 2.0.50727; .NET CLR 3.0.4506.2152; .NET CLR 3.5.30729)

Mozilla/5.0 (Windows; U; Windows NT 5.1; en-US; rv:1.8.1.20) Gecko/20081217 Firefox/2.0.0.20 (.NET CLR 3.5.30729)

Firefox UA, but MSIE header-ordering



Active Defense: Counter-Attack 1

- Safe haven hosting providers
 - Do not care about attacks controlled from their site
 - Will not respond or cooperate with takedowns
 - Worse, they may share your correspondence with the attacker
- What are the remedies?
 - Launch a counter-attack against the DDoS control server
 - Probably not legal most places
 - May prolong the attack same as with takedown
 - Work with ISP/Security community
 - Null route the controller IP or netblock from the rest of the world
 - Expose uncooperative hosting providers in the press what's known as a "Krebsing" (see McColo, 3FN)



Active Defense: Counter-Attack 2

- Many control servers are poorly programmed
- Vulnerable to SQL injection
 - Expose admin authentication credentials
 - Enumerate bots
 - Insert commands
- Vulnerable to cross-site scripting attacks (XSS)
 - Add an iframe to the attacker's stats page and track his IP
 - Add proxy-decloaking code to the iframe for extra credit
- Poorly-thought-out interface with links to third-party sites
 Reveal the control panel URL in the referrer log
- Legality of taking advantage of these techniques still an issue



Illusion Bot SQLi Example 1









```
/* Online bots listing */
function db list bots()
      $nickname = cutstr( $arr["nickname"], 12 );
      $fullnickname = $arr["nickname"];
      if ($status)
             $nickref = "<a title=\"Add</pre>
nick\" href=\"javascript:addn('$fullnickname');\">$nickname</a>
";
                    nickname is varchar(64), enough room for an iframe tag
```



Final Word

- Personal networking and information sharing is key
 - Ahead of time, not after-the-fact
- Cybercrime laws not up-to-date
 - Law enforcement is unable to respond in a timely fashion to protect the innocent
 - Fear of prosecution keeps those who are able to respond from doing so with all measures available
 - Untested, but some jurisdictions have "nuisance laws" that protect citizens who take action that would be otherwide illegal
 - Legislators need to understand the issues involved and provide options for self-defense without fear of incarceration



Questions?



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